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COMMENTS

MISSOURI V. JENKINS: WIDENING THE MISTAKES OF
MILLIKEN V. BRADLEY

I.

INTRODUCTION

The scope of a court's power to provide equitable remedies
has been the subject of countless court challenges and scholarly
debates. Perhaps no area is more controversial in this regard than
the federal judicial attempts to desegregate public schools. The
principle guiding equity power in this arena is that "the nature of
the desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and
scope of the constitutional violation."' This limit on equity power,
however, must be reconciled with the mandate in Green v. County
School Board that a court must "take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimi2
nation would be eliminated root and branch."
Since the original proclamation in Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown 1') that the operation of segregated school systems
violates the Constitution,3 the Court has rapidly retreated from
Brown's broad mission.4 The Rehnquist Court has become increasingly frustrated with the large degree of judicial intervention in
school desegregation cases,5 and now allows for release from judi-

1. Milliken v. Bradley ("Milliken IF), 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (citing Swam v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
2. 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
3. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
4. Steven I. Locke, Comment, Board of Education v. Dowell: A Look at the New
Phase in Desegregation Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 537, 545 (1992) ("Beginning in the
late 1970s, the focus of court decisions has shifted from limiting the breadth of desegregation orders to lifting those orders entirely." (footnotes omitted)).
5. See infra note 18.
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cial oversight for findings of partial unitary status, 6 or if "the vestiges of de jure segregation have been eliminated to the extent
practicable." 7
The tension between effective remedies and limiting the scope
of judicial oversight has been further exacerbated by the recent
Supreme Court decision in Missouri v. Jenkins8 ("Jenkins IF').9
There, the Court held that a desegregation plan ordered by the
district court, which attempted to create better inner-city schools in
order to attract white students living in the surrounding suburbs,
was an impermissible interdistrict remedy barred by the 1974 decision in Milliken v. Bradley ("Milliken F').0 Yet some form of
remedy in which the effects extend beyond district lines may be
the only practical solution to remedy purposeful segregation: "In
most metropolitan school desegregation situations, desegregation
would be greatly facilitated if judges began to recognize that, except in isolated rural areas, relief should not be limited to the
immediate school districts. Unless remedies are regional, their
institution will lead to a dramatic decline in white pupil school
enrollment.""
In describing the decision in Jenkins II, one journalist wrote
that "[1]ittle noticed among the court's rulings was a decision two
weeks ago on school desegregation, yet it is this decision-which
severely limits the judicial role in the nation's classrooms-that
will have the most piercing effect."' 2 Jesse Jackson was quoted as
stating that "[n]o question, the Kansas City case was the major

6. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 499 (1992).
7. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 238 (1991).
8. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
9. There was an earlier Missouri v. Jenkins before the Supreme Court, which arguably
should be called "Jenkins I," and which would actually make the most recent Jenkins
case "Jenkins III." Though the majority in Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995),
cited the earliest Supreme Court case as "Jenkins I," this Comment will designate the
1990 Supreme Court case as "Jenkins I" and the 1995 case as "Jenkins II" since the
earlier case did not directly involve desegregation. Perhaps in an attempt to highlight the
protracted litigation in this case, the petitioners calculate this case to be Jenkins VII.
Petitioners' Brief at 15, Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995) (No. 93-1823) (citing the
appellate court case as Jenkins VI).
10. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2051.
11. Grover G. Hankins, The Constitutional Implications of Residential Segregation and
School Segregation-To Boldly Go Where Few Courts Have Gone, 30 How. L.J. 773, 773
(1987) (footnote omitted).
12. Juan Williams, The Court's Other Bombshell; Schools, Not Voting Rights, Was the
Key Racial Ruling, WASH. POST, July 2, 1995, at Cl.
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case the court decided and it was devastating."' 3 These are particularly strong condemnations of Jenkins II since, on the same day,
the Supreme Court decided Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.14
Adarand effectively abolished all government affirmative action
programs by holding that all racial classifications, regardless of
their intent, would receive strict scrutiny. Yet by redefining "interdistrict" so as to broaden the already detrimental holding of
Milliken I, the Court in Jenkins II has apparently abandoned any
attempt to remedy segregation.
Justice Thomas, concurring in Jenkins II, wrote that "a deserving end does not justify all possible means," referring to attempts
to remedy school segregation. 6 In this latest desegregation case
before the Supreme Court, the Court did not heed Thomas's principle when it used an overly broad interpretation of Supreme Court
Rule 14.117 to answer a question not before the Court for the purpose of limiting judicial authority.' However, if the end of desegregation cannot justify broad remedial powers, then certainly the
end of judicial restraint cannot justify broad interpretations of Supreme Court jurisdiction. 9
This Comment will examine the Court's strained use of judicial authority to reach its desired outcome. Specifically, part II of
this Comment will discuss the background of the Missouri v.
Jenkins cases and show how the majority stretched its own Rules
to reach its result. Part II will discuss how the Court redefined

13. Id.
14. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
15. Id. at 2113.
16. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2073 (Thomas, J., concurring).
17. See infra notes 70-84, 87 and accompanying text.
18. It is clear that one goal of the Court was to limit judicial authority. Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that the "end purpose" of desegregation orders "is not only 'to remedy
the violation' . . . but also 'to restore state and local authorities to the control of [the]
school system."' Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2056 (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,
489 (1992)). Justice O'Connor wrote: "Unlike Congress[,] . . . federal courts have no
comparable license and must always observe their limited judicial role." Id. at 2061
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Thomas wrote that "[s]uch extravagant uses of judicial
power are at odds with the history and tradition of the equity power and the Framers'
design." Id. at 2067 (Thomas, J., concurring).
19. Predicting the possible activism of the Rehnquist Court, one author wrote that
"Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor and Scalia, and any other new Justices of a
strongly conservative political bent, if they become a majority, will have to choose between institutional restraint and a form of judicial activism not very different from the
activism of their immediate predecessors, albeit in pursuit of conservative rather than
liberal policy goals." Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism or
Self-Restraint?, 47 MD. L. REv. 118, 135 (1987).
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interdistrict by ignoring the important distinctions between
Milliken I and Hills v. Gautreaux.° Finally, part IV will discuss
the ramifications of Jenkins I on the ability of courts to offer
effective remedies to children in segregated school systems.
II.

THE STRAINED PATH TO JENKINS II

After the Brown v. Board of Education decision ordered the
desegregation of public schools," Kansas City was one of many
school districts that tried to evade that order.' It did so by redrawing district boundary lines in order to create a single-race district,' assigning children to single-race schools,24 and by relying
on the Missouri Attorney General's declaration that the Brown
mandate was "unenforceable." ' In fact, the Missouri Constitution
required the separation of the races in public schools, and that constitutional provision was not repealed until 1976.26
In 1977, the Kansas City Municipal School District
("KCMSD") and several students brought suit against the State of
Missouri alleging that the State and surrounding suburban school
districts had "caused and perpetuated a system of racial segregation
in the [KCMSD]." 27 The district court for the Western District of
Missouri realigned the KCMSD as a defendant' and the suits
against the suburban school districts were eventually dismissed.
The district court found that the State and KCMSD were liable for
operating an intradistrict segregated school system within Kansas
City, and several remedial orders were implemented to eliminate
the vestiges of discrimination."

20. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
21. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
22. Theodore M. Shaw, Missouri v. Jenkins: Are We Really a Desegregated Society?,
61 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 57-58 (1992).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
26. Id.
27. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2042.
28. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1505 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
29. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2042.
30. Id.
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A.
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Jenkins I

The district court, in 1986, approved a remedy that allowed

for the creation of a magnet school program at a cost of
$142 million. 31 "'Magnet Schools,' as generally understood, are
public schools of voluntary enrollment designed to promote integration by drawing students away from their neighborhoods and pri' Unvate schools through distinctive curricula and high quality."32
der the district court plan almost all of the schools in the entire
district were converted into magnet schools. 33 In order to fund the
desegregation plan, the district court ordered a specific dollar
amount increase in the KCMSD tax levy.' The court of appeals
reversed in part, allowing the levy to stand, but stated that the
district court should in the future order the KCMSD to submit the
tax levy and enjoin the State from prohibiting the increase, rather
than impose the tax itself.3"
In 1990, the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Jenkins36
("Jenkins F,)37 upheld the reversal and modifications ordered by
the Eighth Circuit, stating that principles of comity require that the
district court only directly impose a tax when no alternative, less
intrusive means are available.38 In this case, that meant that the
district court could not set the actual tax rate, but could order the
KCMSD to submit a levy in excess of a state constitutional limit
in order to fund its share of the desegregation remedy.39

31. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 40 (1990).
32. Id. at 40 n.6. But see generally Kimberly C. West, Note, A Desegregation Tool
that Backfired: Magnet Schools and Classroom Segregation, 103 YALE L.J. 2567 (1994)
(discussing the continued racial segregation within magnet school programs).
33. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2043.
34. Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 412-13 (W.D. Mo. 1987), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), affd in part, rev'd in part, 495 U.S. 33

(1990).
35. Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F. 2d 1295, 1314 (8th Cir. 1988), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). The Missouri Constitution limited property taxes to a specific
dollar amount per assessed value that could be increased by two-thirds of voters but only
to another specified limit. Mo. CONST., art. 10, § 11(b), (c).
36. 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
37. See supra .ote 9 (discussing the numbering of the Jenkins opinions within this
Comment).
38. Jenkins I, 495 U.S. at 37, 50-52.
39. Id. at 43, 58. The Court's holding that a district court does have the power to impose a tax was significant and has been the subject of much debate. See, e.g., Drew A.
Perkins, Casenote, When the Prohibition on Judicial Taxation Interferes with an Equitable
Remedy in a School Desegregation Case, 26 LAND & WATER L. REv. 373 (1991); Thomas J. Walsh, Casenote, "No Taxation Without Representation . . . Unless Desegregation":

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:579

The Jenkins I petition for certiorari presented two questions.'
Only the first question, regarding whether a Federal court could
impose a tax, was granted certiorari.4 The second question raised
in the petition asked: "Whether a federal court, remedying an
intradistrict violation under Brown v. Board of Education, may a)
impose a duty to attract additional non-minority students to a
school district, and b) require improvements to make the district
schools comparable to those in surrounding districts."'42 It was this
second question, posed but not granted certiorari in Jenkins I, that
was ultimately answered by Jenkins I.'
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia, stated in Jenkins I that he was troubled
that the Court even addressed the constitutionality of the district
court's tax levy, because the whole magnet school remedy ordered
by the district court was an impermissible interdistrict remedy for
an intradistrict violation.' The magnet school program was interdistrict because the plan tried "to make a magnet of the district as
a whole. The hope was to draw new nonminority students from
outside the district."' Justice Kennedy's detailed arguments in
support of the proposition that the remedy was impermissible foreshadow with striking similarity the arguments adopted by the majority in Jenkins II.' While admitting that the Court was required
through its "limited grant of certiorari to assume that the remedy
chosen by the District Court was a permissible exercise of its
remedial discretion," Justice Kennedy still thought it was the
Court's duty to address the underlying remedy in deciding whether
the tax was appropriate.47

The Power of Federal Courts to Order Tax Increases to Desegregate Schools: Missouri v.
Jenkins, 12 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 191 (1991).
40. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2076 (Souter, J., dissenting).
41. Jenkins I, 495 U.S. at 45.
42. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2076 (citations omitted) (Souter, J., dissenting).
43. See Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2047 (rejecting certiorari).
44. Jenkins I, 495 U.S. at 76-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
45. Id. at 60.
46. For example, Justice Kennedy wrote in Jenkins I that "[sluch a plan [as that
adopted by the District Court] as a practical matter raises many of the concerns involved
in interdistrict desegregation remedies." Jenkins 1, 495 U.S. at 76 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in Jenkins 11 that the district court plan was an impermissible interdistrict remedy. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2052.
47. Jenkins 1, 495 U.S. at 78-80 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
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B.

Jenkins II

As part of the broad desegregation plan, which the taxes were
used to support in Jenkins I, the district court in 1987 ordered
substantial capital expenditures, including salary increases for almost all of the school district's 5000 employees in order to ensure
quality education throughout the district.' The State of Missouri
challenged the district court order compelling salary increases for
all KCMSD staff as beyond the scope of the court's remedial
authority.49 The State also challenged the continued funding of
remedial "quality education" programs under Freeman v. Pitts,"
arguing that the KCMSD had "achieved partial unitary status." '
Under Freeman, courts may withdraw their supervision of segregated school systems incrementally when particular discrete aspects of
the system are found to be no longer segregated. 2 The Supreme
Court remanded this aspect of the case to the district court, explaining the correct test to apply under Freeman.3 Specifically,
the Court held that "improved achievement on test scores is not
necessarily required for the State to achieve partial unitary status as
'
to the quality education programs."54
In its petition for certiorari, the State presented two questions,
both of which were granted certiorari. The first question asked
whether a school district could fail to satisfy the 14th Amendment,
and therefore "preclud[e] a finding of partial unitary status," solely
because test scores had not risen to some "unspecified level." 56
The second question presented was whether the order of salary
increases was so attenuated as to violate notions that a remedy
must directly address the constitutional violation.
In their brief to the Court, the Petitioners refrained the second
question concerning salary increases into a question addressing the

48. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2044.
49. Id. at 2045.
50. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
51. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2045.
52. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490-91 (1992).
53. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2055. The Freeman test is "whether there has been full
and satisfactory compliance with the [desegregation] decree," "whether retention of judicial
control is necessary or practicable to achieve compliance with the decree," and "whether
the school district has demonstrated . . . its good faith commitment to the whole of the
court's decree." Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491.
54. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2055.
55. Id. at 2046.
56. Id. at 2076 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Petition for Certiorari at i).
57. Id.
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validity of an interdistrict remedy when there was no showing of
an interdistrict violation." The petition for certiorari had asked,
"Whether a federal court order granting salary increases to
virtually every employee of a school district-including
non-instructional personnel-as a part of a school desegregation remedy conflicts with applicable decisions of this
Court which require that remedial components must directly
address and relate to the constitutional violation and be
tailored to cure the condition that offends the Constitution?"59
The question as rewritten in the Petitioners' brief asked,
"Whether the courts below erred in implementing an interdistrict
remedy in an intradistrict case by ordering salary increases for all
employees of the school district for the purpose of increasing the
desegregative attractiveness of the school district."
The
Petitioners' question was now almost identical to the question to
which they were denied certiorari in 1990." As the Respondents'
brief pointed out, the Petitioners devoted only a few pages to the
questions upon which certiorari was granted and devoted the rest
of their brief to issues not before the Court.62
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Jenkins I apparently guided
the State of Missouri to reformulate its arguments. 3 Noticeably
resembling Justice Kennedy's opinion, the State's principal argument was that the district court's order to increase salaries was
interdistrict despite only an intradistrict finding of discrimination:'
There is no question that increases in the "quality" of education in the Kansas City schools theoretically could promote integration, in the sense that superior quality schools
might further the goal of attracting additional non-minority
students from the suburbs or private academies. But that
goal is inherently interdistrict in nature, and this case is,

58. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 9, at i.
59. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2076 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Petition for Certiorari at i).
60. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 9 at i.
61. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (stating the question raised in Jenkins 1).
62, Respondents' Brief at 1-2, Jenkins I1, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995) (No. 93-1823).
63. See Jenkins 1, 495 U.S. at 76 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (stating that the district court order was an impermissible interdistrict remedy).
64. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2049.
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and always has been, an intradistrict case.6
Agreeing with the State, a majority of the Court held that the
entire remedial program, including the salary increases, was an
interdistrict remedy beyond the scope of the violation.' The entire
order was interdistrict because the district court "set out on a program to create a school district that was equal to or superior to the
surrounding [suburban school districts]." 7 To achieve this end, the
district court's order was "not designed solely to redistribute the
students within the KCMSD.... Instead, its purpose [was] to
attract nonminority students from outside the KCMSD schools."68
A court may not seek to create a better school system for the
purpose of attracting whites into the school district unless the suburbs have been found in violation of the Constitution.69
C. The Court Expands Rule 14.1
The Supreme Court may grant certiorari for an entire petition
or make a limited grant of certiorari to only a portion of the questions presented." In Jenkins I, the Court used its authority to
make a limited grant of certiorari to answer only the question
regarding the power of a district court to impose a tax, and not the
question concerning the validity of the remedy the tax was being
imposed to fund.7' In Jenkins II, the Court granted certiorari to
the entire petition, agreeing to answer two distinct questions.'
Neither question on its face concerned the validity of the magnet
school desegregation plan.
Under Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a), a question presented to the
Court in a petition for a writ of certiorari will "be deemed to
comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein. Only the
questions set forth in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be
considered by the Court."73 However, the question must be "more
closely allied to the question raised than merely being 'related' or
'complementary' to that question.17 4 As stated by the Court, "Rule

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Petitioners' Brief, supra note 9, at 19.
Jenkins 1I,115 S. Ct. at 2051.
Id. at 2050.
Id. at 2051.
Id.
ROBERT L. STERN ET AL, SUPREME COURT PRACIICE § 5.10 (7th Ed. 1993).
Jenkins 1, 495 U.S. at 45.
Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2046.
Sup. CT. R. 14.1(a).
STERN, supra note 70, § 6.25 (citing Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S 519, 537
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14.1(a) forces the petitioner to focus on the questions the Court
has viewed as particularly important, thus enabling us to make
' However, a majority of the Court
efficient use of our resources."75
held that the entire school desegregation plan was fairly before the
Court when the question concerning the validity of salary increases
was raised. 76
The case law clearly establishes that "an issue is fairly comprehended in a question presented when the issue must be resolved in
order to answer the question."' It was certainly possible to assess
the validity of test scores and salary increases without questioning
the validity of the entire remedial plan.78 Chief Justice Rehnquist
asserted that the remedial program was before the Court because,
"[g]iven that the District Court's basis for its salary order was
grounded in 'improving the desegregative attractiveness of the
KCMSD,' we must consider the propriety of that reliance in order
to resolve properly the State's challenge to that order." 79 Under
Chief Justice Rehnquist's rationale, however, that question should
have been answered in Jenkins I before the tax was imposed; yet
the majority in Jenkins I refused to consider the entire remedial
order.
Justice Souter, in his dissent, argued that even if a loose interpretation of Rule 14.1(a) allowed for this inquiry, such a course is
unfair because the litigants were not warned in advance." The
Court normally operates under a notion of fairness: "Were we
routinely to consider questions beyond those raised in the petition,
the respondent would lack any opportunity in advance of litigation
on the merits to argue that such questions are not worthy of review."81 The dissent stated that "if it really were essential to decide the foundational issue to address the two questions that are
presented, the Court could give notice to the parties of its intention
to reach the broader issue, and allow for adequate briefing and

(1992)).
75. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 536 (1992).
76. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2047.
77. Id. at 2077 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Procunier v. Navarete, 434 U.S. 555, 560
n.6 (1978), and United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551-552 n.5 (1980)).
78. Id.
79. Jenkins II, 115 S. CL at 2047 (quoting Petition for Certiorari at A-90) (citations
omitted).
80. Id. at 2077 (Souter, J., dissenting).
81. Yee, 503 U.S. at 536.
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argument on it."'82 It is a normal procedure for the Court to ask
litigants to further brief an issue if it has not been briefed."
Though the petitioners did give notice to the respondents by virtue
of the arguments adopted in their brief, the respondents, believing
those questions were not before the Court, only briefly addressed
the validity of the underlying remedial order.84
Perhaps even more troubling than the Court's broad reading of
Rule 14.1 is that the Court had already denied certiorari in 1990
for the exact same issue under the exact same circumstances as
that decided in 1995. By doing this, the Court undermined its own
judicial authority by making decisions appear politically motivated.
Nothing in the litigation substantially changed between 1990 and
1995. As one journalist observed, "[t]he main thing that has
changed since 1990 is that Justice Thurgood Marshall-the lawyer
who argued the Brown case-has been replaced by Justice Clarence Thomas." 5
This broad reading of Supreme Court Rule 14.1, as well as the
Court's willingness to invalidate the very magnet school remedy
that in 1990 supported the Court's order to impose a tax,86 shows
a strong activism from the conservative side of the bench. In describing this activist stance of the Rehnquist Court, one author
wrote that "we are now experiencing a period of judicial activism
bent on overturning many civil rights gains of the past 40
years.... If the Supreme Court continues to be stacked with
ideologues, it is conceivable that people will one day not simply
reject the authority of the court, but reject our entire system of law
'
as well."87

82. Jenkins II, 115 S. CL at 2077-78 (Souter, J., dissenting).
83. See STERN, supra note 70, §§ 6.25-6.26 (discussing the Court's power to rephrase
the questions presented).
84. See Respondents' Brief, supra note 62, at 44-49.
85. William H. Freivogel, School Desegregation Comes to a Crossroads, ST. Louis
PosT-DisPATcH, June 18, 1995, at lB.
86. See Paul C. Roberts, Two Court Rulings: Dissenting Opinions, THE COMMERCIAL
APPEAL, June 18, 1995, at B6 ("From the standpoint of constitutional law, the second
round of Missouri v. Jenkins is disastrous. What emerges is the spectacle of the Supreme
Court permitting [district court] Judge Clark in 1990 to illegally impose judicial taxation
for desegregation purposes prior to ruling in June 1995 on the permissibility of his desegregation remedy.").
87. Roberto Rodriguez & Patrisia Gonzales, Justices' Rulings May Diminish Meaning of
Laws, FRESNO BEE, July 17, 1995, at B5.
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REDEFINING "INTERDISTRICT"

In deciding that the district court had exceeded its remedial
authority by providing an "interdistrict remedy," the Jenkins II
Court stated that Milliken P8 informed their decision.89 However,
by so deciding, the Court ignored important distinctions between
Milliken I and the 1976 housing desegregation case of Hills v.
Gautreaux. By ignoring those distinctions, the Court rejected the
fundamental message of Gautreaux: an interdistrict remedy is permissible if it does not bind an otherwise innocent and independent
governmental entity. 9' Furthermore, the Court reframed the term
"interdistrict" to mean something unrecognizable. The Milliken I
and Gautreaux Courts presupposed an involuntary order imposed
on outlying districts. There was no such imposition in Jenkins IL
An intradistrict remedy that has interdistrict effects is not necessarily an "interdistrict remedy." If interdistrict effects were to make for
an interdistrict remedy, all desegregation orders that cause white
flight would be impermissible.
A.

Milliken v. Bradley

Milliken v. Bradley, a 1974 school desegregation case, held that
a district court had exceeded its remedial powers when it ordered
an interdistrict remedy without a showing of interdistrict de jure
segregation. 92 The district court had ordered a metropolitan-wide
remedy that required the consolidation of fifty-four separate school
districts into a single Detroit metropolitan district after it found de
jure segregation in the Detroit city schools.93 The Supreme Court
held that "without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect,
there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy."9 4 The Milliken II Court formally announced a three-part test
that was developed in Milliken I to evaluate the scope of equitable
remedies: (1) the remedy must be related to the constitutional
violation; (2) the remedy must try to restore the victims to the
place they would have been absent the constitutional violation; and

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

418 U.S. 717 (1974).
Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2048-49.
425 U.S. 284 (1976).
Id. at 305-06.
Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 744-45.
Id. at 740, 745.
Id. at 745.
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(3) the federal courts must respect the issues of state and local
autonomy.95
The Milliken I Court criticized the district court's basic assumption that "school district lines are no more than arbitrary lines
on a map drawn 'for political convenience."' 96 The Court explained that rather than "arbitrary lines," the boundaries designating
distinct school districts represent "deeply rooted . . . local control
over the operation of schools."' Besides tension over the loss of
local control, the Milliken Court was deeply concerned about the
district court becoming a "'legislative authority"' to resolve such
unanswered complex questions as what would be the status of the
currently elected school boards, which boards would levy taxes
to
98
support the mega-district, and who would determine curricula.
The interdistrict remedy was impermissible because it would
bind an otherwise independent political entity that was not guilty
of the constitutional violation." The Court stated that "[b]efore the
boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set
aside ... it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district."'" In his concurrence, Justice Stewart explained that "traditions of local control of schools, together
with the difficulty of a judicially supervised restructuring of local
administration of schools,
render improper and inequitable such an
interdistrict response. ' ' 1° 1
The Milliken I decision was heavily criticized in that it "sanctioned, and even encouraged, white flight from the cities to the
suburbs where white children could be protected from forced integration.""lec The dissent focused on the ineffectiveness of future

95. Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81.
96. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 741.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 743-44.
99. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293 (1976) ("Although the Milliken opinion
discussed the many practical problems that would be encountered in the consolidation of
numerous school districts by judicial decree, the Court's decision rejecting the metropolitan
area desegregation order was actually based on fundamental limitations on the remedial
powers of the federal courts to restructure the operation of local and state governmental
entities.").
100. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 744-45.
101. Id. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring).
102. Robert L. Carter, Public School Desegregation: A Contemporary Analysis, 37 ST.
Louis U. LJ. 885, 890 (1993); see also Milliken, 418 U.S. at 759 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("When we rule against the metropolitan area remedy we take a step that will likely
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desegregation after Milliken I: "The majority ... seems to have
forgotten the District Court's explicit finding that a Detroit-only
decree, the only remedy permitted under today's decision, 'would
not accomplish desegregation.' 13
B.

Hills v. Gautreaux

Two years after the five member majority in Milliken I, a
unanimous Supreme Court decided Hills v. Gautreaux.'" After
ten years of litigation, the Gautreaux Court found purposeful segregation in Chicago public housing. The plaintiffs were tenants of the
Chicago Housing Authority ("CHA") who alleged that CHA, HUD,
and the Chicago City Council were purposely locating public housing in all black neighborhoods. 5 HUD and CHA were found to
have violated the 14th Amendment of the Constitution by maintaining segregated housing facilities.'"
In fashioning a remedy, the district court denied the
respondents' request for a metropolitan wide remedy because "the
wrongs were committed within the limits of Chicago and solely
against residents of the City."'0 7 The court of appeals reversed,
stating that a metropolitan-wide remedy was appropriate.' Before
the decision was announced, however, the Supreme Court decided
Milliken L' 9 The appellate court distinguished Milliken I and held
that a metropolitan-wide remedy was not barred "because of the
equitable and administrative distinctions between a metropolitan
public housing plan and the consolidation of numerous local school
districts.""'
The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit in a unanimous decision, distinguishing the result from Milliken L'" In
Milliken I, school districts that had not violated the Constitution

put the problems of the blacks and our society back to the period that antedated the
'separate but equal' regime of Plessy v. Ferguson.").
103. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
105. Id. at 286.
106. Id. at 288-89.
107. Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690, 691 (N.D. Il1. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), affd sub nom. Hills
v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
108. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 939 (7th Cir. 1974), aoffd sub
nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
109. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 291 (1976).
110. Id. (citing Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 503 F.2d at 935-36).
111. Id. at 297, 306.
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would have been forced to consolidate under the district court's
remedial order."' In Gautreaux, however, "a judicial order directing relief beyond the boundary lines of Chicago [would] not necessarily entail coercion of uninvolved governmental units....
The Gautreaux Court held that Milliken I represented an understanding of the limits of equity power and the role of federal
courts, and not a rule against interdistrict remedies in all cases.'14
"Nothing in the Milliken decision suggests a per se rule that federal courts lack authority to order parties found to have violated the
Constitution to undertake remedial efforts beyond the municipal
boundaries of the city where the violation occurred."". 5 The
Gautreaux Court further elucidated that "the District Court's proposed remedy in Milliken was impermissible because of the limits
on the federal judicial power to interfere with the operation of state
political6 entities that were not implicated in unconstitutional con'
duct.""
C. Jenkins II Re-reads Gautreaux
Gautreaux represented the limits of the Milliken I decision. If
innocent governmental units are not coerced, then interdistrict remedies may be appropriate. When the majority of the Court in
Jenkins II found Milliken I to inform their decision, they seemed to
ignore the distinctions emphasized in Gautreaux and thereby effectively overruled Gautreaux. The Jenkins II dissent argued that
Gautreaux controlled because Jenkins II would not bind any innocent autonomous entities." 7 Since the magnet school program
adopted by the district court would only cross district lines if students voluntarily moved across those lines, the remedy would not
be an inappropriate interdistrict remedy."'
Yet the Jenkins 1I majority, composed of the same four Justices
who dissented in Jenkins I, stated that Gautreaux was not overruled,"9 and noted three major distinctions between Gautreaux
and Jenkins I.'
First, the Court stated that in Gautreaux, the

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 743.
Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 298.
Id. at 294, 298.
Id. at 298 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2088 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2089.
Id. at 2053 ("Our decision today is fully consistent with Gautreaux.").
Id. at 2053-54.
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Court had found that the "'relevant geographic area for the purposes of [plaintiffs'] housing options [was] the Chicago housing market, not the Chicago city limits."""' Supporting this, Justice
O'Connor's concurrence stated that HUD's authority extended
beyond the city limits, so limiting the remedy to the city limits
would have been "'arbitrary and mechanical.'"' Further, the
Court said Milliken I was distinguished in Gautreaux because "ra"an escial segregation in schools is 'to be dealt with in terms 1of
m
system."'
school
administrative
and
geographic
tablished
Second, the majority noted that Gautreaux involved a federal
agency, HUD, rather than a State, so it did not raise the same
federalism issues as did Jenkins 11.124 Third, the majority stressed
that the Gautreaux Court did not actually support an interdistrict
remedy; rather, they remanded to see if such a remedy was appropriate."
The dissent, however, countered this reading of Gautreaux by
pointing out that in Gautreaux there was "no indication that the
violation had produced any effects outside the city itself,"'"m undermining any argument that the constitutional violation was actually metropolitan-wide. While the dissent acknowledged that the
Gautreaux Court found the housing market to be metropolitanwide, it further stated that the remedy was permissible "not only
because that was the area of the housing market ... but also
because the trial court could order a remedy in that market without
binding a governmental unit innocent of the violation and free of
its effects.' 2 7
The dissent argued that the clear question before the Supreme
Court in Gautreaux was whether a court could order a remedy that

121. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2053 (quoting Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 299).
122. Id. at 2058 (quoting Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 300). The full quote from Gautreaux,
however, envisions a wider scope of judicial authority: "To foreclose [metropolitan wide]
relief solely because HUD's constitutional violation took place within the city limits of
Chicago would transform Milliken's principled limitation on the exercise of federal judicial
authority into an arbitrary and mechanical shield for those found to have engaged in
unconstitutional conduct." Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 300.
123. Jenkins I1, 115 S. Ct. at 2053 (quoting Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 298 n.13).
124. Id. at 2054.
125. Id. at 2053. However, with the understanding that an interdistrict remedy was constitutional, HUD and the plaintiffs voluntarily entered into an interdistrict agreement. See
Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp 665, 668 (N.D. IlI. 1981), affid sub nom. Gautreaux
v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
126. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2088 (Souter, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 2089.
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extended beyond the Chicago city boundaries, specifically "'the
permissibility . . . of "interdistrict relief for discrimination in public
housing in the absence of a finding of an inter-district violation..' .... While the dissent did not directly discuss Chief Justice
Rehnquist's federalism distinction, it is clear that the dissent did
not find any federalism concerns in Gautreaux, not because it
involved a federal actor, but rather because no innocent sovereign
was bound by the district court's order:
We held that a district court may indeed subject a governmental perpetrator of segregative practices to an order for
relief with intended consequences beyond the perpetrator's
own subdivision, even in the absence of effects outside that
subdivision, so long as the decree does not bind the authorities of other governmental units that are free of violations
and segregative effects. 9
While the majority tries to distinguish Jenkins II from
Gautreaux, the distinctions seem to misunderstand the fundamental
holding of Gautreaux. The district court, upon remand of
Gautreaux, clearly understood the ruling of the Supreme Court to
give the district court full power to order relief outside the city
boundaries.' 30 The issue raised in Gautreaux, and reiterated by the
unanimous Court, was simply "the authority of the District Court
to order HUD to take remedial action outside the city limits of
Chicago.'' The Court held that HUD's "constitutional and statutory violations were committed in Chicago."''
The Gautreaux
opinion squarely rests on the assertion that the remedy need not be
limited by the geographical boundaries of where the violation occurred so long as no other innocent governmental entity is bound
33
by the granted relief.
Even if Gautreaux was not overruled, although the dissent suggests otherwise,13 1 the meaning of "interdistrict" has been so

128. Id. at 2088 (quoting Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 292).
129. Id. at 2088.
130. See Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. at 665.
131. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 296.
132. Id. at 297.
133. See id. at 299-300 (finding that an order against HUD and CHA, which was not
limited to Chicago, but instead applied to the greater metropolitan area, was consistent
with the "nature and extent of the constitutional violation").
134. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2090 (Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that "Gautreaux's
holding is now effectively overruled").
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broadened that the Gautreaux exception is rendered meaningless.
While the litigants in the actual ongoing Gautreaux litigation may
not have grounds to challenge the Gautreaux exception, it seems
unlikely that the Court will ever again recognize situations that require courts to order remedies that extend beyond district lines,
unless a federal entity is the violator. Yet, the Court in Gautreaux
recognized that "[tio foreclose [metropolitan-wide] relief solely because HUD's constitutional violation took place within the city
limits of Chicago would transform Milliken's principled limitation
on the exercise of federal judicial authority into an arbitrary and
mechanical shield
for those found to have engaged in unconstitu35
tional conduct."'
IV.

THE EFFECT OF JENKINS II ON THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION

In the early desegregation cases, the Court searched for ways
to remedy segregation. Believing that purposeful segregation caused
injury to minority students who were subjected to those explicit
policies, courts ordered systems to become unitary, whereby the
schools would no longer be recognizable as single race schools.
However, in Milliken I, the Court stopped looking at effective
remedies, instead factoring the interests of non-violating school districts into the equation and erring on the side of autonomous
school districts.'36 In their brief to the Supreme Court, the
Milliken I plaintiffs explained that "'[i]f that dividing line was permitted to stand without breach to perpetuate the basic dual structure, the intentional confinement of black children in schools separate from whites will continue for the foreseeable future. The violation of constitutional rights will continue without remedy. Such a
result [would] repeal Brown and return these children to
Plessy.," 137

135. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 300.
136. See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 762 n.13 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Mr. Justice Stewart
indicates that equitable factors weigh in favor of local school control and the avoidance
of administrative difficulty given the lack of an 'interdistrict' violation. It would seem to
me that the equities are stronger in favor of the children of Detroit who have been deprived of their constitutional right to equal treatment by the State of Michigan.").
137. PAUL R. DIMOND, BEYOND BUSING, INSIDE THE CHALLENGE TO URBAN SEGREGA-

TION 101 (1985).
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The Movement -Away from Brown

Understanding the ramifications for school desegregation of
limiting, if not overturning, Gautreaux requires an examination of
the Court's retreat from the mandates of Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown IF').3 In Brown II, the Court held that segregation
must be abolished with "all deliberate speed."'39 School desegregation proponents viewed the Brown decisions as allowing school
districts to continue to resist orders to desegregate." However,
thirteen years later in Green v. County School Board, the Court
held that a freedom of choice plan to desegregate the Virginia
county school system "fails to provide meaningful assurance of
prompt and effective disestablishment of a dual system.''. The
Green decision added meaningful requirements to the broad mandate of Brown II by stating that "[t]he burden on a school board
today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to
work, and promises realistically to work now."'4 The Court further held that "whatever plan is adopted will require evaluation in
practice, and the court should retain jurisdiction until it is clear
that state-imposed segregation has been completely removed."'43
The Rehnquist Court has often retreated from the mandates of
Brown II and Green. Several decisions by the Court have severely
undercut the command that de jure segregation must be completely
destroyed until a unitary system has been created. Milliken, as
already discussed, held that an interdistrict remedy for an
intradistrict violation was inappropriate if it bound other innocent
governmental entities." Writing for the majority in Board of
Education v. Dowell, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that "it is a
mistake to treat words such as 'dual' and 'unitary' as if they were

138. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
139. Id. at 301.
140. See generally Robert L. Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L.
REv. 237 (1968-69) (discussing the Warren's Court long involvement in the development
of race relations law). Carter writes that "it is clear that what the formula required was
movement toward compliance on terms that the white South could accept." Id. at 243.
141. 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968). A freedom of choice plan allows students to voluntarily
attend any school within the district, thereby abolishing any governmental control of segregative school assignments. Id. at 430. However, a freedom of choice plan that follows a
de jure segregated system will usually fail to integrate without proactive measures. Id. at
437-38.
142. lId at 439 (emphasis omitted).
143. Id. (citation omitted).
144. See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:579

actually found in the Constitution.' ' 45 Adopting a new test, the
Court held that a school board may be released from judicial oversight if "the local authorities have operated in compliance with [the
desegregation decree] for a reasonable period of time."'" The
new test asks only whether a school district in violation has done
all that is practicable to return the school district to a unitary,
nonracial status. 47 In a sharp dissent, Justice Marshall criticized
the majority's new, more lenient standard: "[O]ur school-desegregation jurisprudence establishes that the effects of past discrimination
remain chargeable to the school district regardless of its lack of
continued enforcement of segregation, and the remedial decree is
required until those effects have been finally eliminated."'"
B.

How Jenkins II Changes the Landscape

Milliken I is a watershed in the history of desegregation jurisprudence. As one author explains, "Neighborhood schools were
considered a legitimate desegregation tool by the Supreme Court in
Brown II when it opined that a permissible remedy would be the
'revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units
to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools
on a nonracial basis.""' 4 9 Yet Milliken I foreclosed such a remedy.
Jenkins H similarly changes the focus by redefining "interdistrict" so that judicial control over desegregation remedies are mostly ineffective. The Milliken I order was impermissible because it
would have restricted an innocent and autonomous entity, other
suburban school districts, by requiring them to become part of a
single mega-district 50 The Gautreaux order was permissible because no such entity would have been so bound; however, the plan
was still an interdistrict remedy because there would have been
substantial involuntary effects on outlying districts.'' Public housing sites would be built within those outlying suburbs, with significant effects within those districts.

145. 498 U.S. 237, 245 (1991).
146. Id. at 248.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 262 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
149. Christine H. Rossell, The Convergence of Black and White Attitudes on School
Desegregation, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 613, 613-14 (1995) (quoting Brown 11, 349
U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955)).
150. See supra part III.A.
151. See supra part III.B.

1996]

MISSOURI V. JENKINS

599

The Milliken II test for evaluating the scope of desegregation
remedies requires that the remedy be related to the constitutional
violation.'
The magnet school program ordered by the district
court in Jenkins H did addressthe intradistrict violation. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist states for the majority in Jenkins II, "As a component in an intradistrict remedy, magnet schools are attractive
because they promote desegregation while limiting the withdrawal
of white student enrollment that may result from mandatory reassignment."'' The issue for the majority is not whether the magnet school program failed to address the intradistrict violation but
rather whether it was an impermissible interdistrict remedy that
violated Milliken I: "The District Court's remedial plan, in this
case, however, is not designed solely to redistribute the students
within the KCMSD ....
Instead, its purpose is to attract
nonminority students from outside the KCMSD schools. But this
interdistrict goal is beyond the scope of the intradistrict violaion .. .
Yet, it is a dilution of the term "interdistrict" to label an order
to create a school system with the ultimate aim of voluntarily
attracting whites to move back into the city as interdistrict. There
are no costs placed on the suburban school districts, and the magnet school plan only effects those districts to the extent students
voluntarily re-enter the KCMSD. The Jenkins II dissent argued that
Milliken I did not mean that a "remedy that takes into account
conditions outside of the district in which a constitutional violation
has been committed is an 'interdistrict remedy.'"'"" The KCMSD
plan of segregative attractiveness, with a goal of attracting suburban white students, is not an interdistrict remedy.'56
Redefining as interdistrict, and therefore impermissible, a remedy that tries to confront the reality of segregation in our inner city
schools is far reaching. Many commentators see the Jenkins H
decision as delineating the end of judicial control over desegregation remedies." s While there is no new rule requiring district

152. Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 280. See supra notes 92-95 and accopanying text (discussing the Milliken 1I test).
153. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2051.
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2087 (Souter, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 2088.
157. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Education: Justices Say Low Achievement Levels of
Minority Schools Don't Justify Long-term Judicial Control, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 1995, at
A15 (writing that Jenkins 1I "make[s] clear that the justices are willing to end desegrega-

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:579

courts to relinquish control without an interdistrict violation, beyond stating that it is impermissible to have interdistrict goals, the
Court has eliminated one of the last effective remedies for segregation: voluntary transfer programs across district boundaries. In the
wake of Milliken I, many commentators had proposed magnet
schools plans as viable desegregation alternatives. Sounding much
like the dissent in Jenkins II, one author has written that "[u]nlike
mandatory reassignment plans ... the districts participating in a
metropolitan voluntary plan retain their independent political identities," and would therefore be permissible under Milliken P"'8
Another author recognized the great burden on courts when
creating such magnet school plans, stating that "[v]oluntary remedies, relying on magnet schools and enhanced educational offerings,
must ... promise to effectively desegregate area schools to pass
constitutional muster. To accomplish these ends, educational offerings must be sufficiently attractive to entice students to voluntarily
transfer to a school outside their neighborhood."'' 9 The irony, of
course, is that if the district court in Jenkins II had tried to create
a less expansive magnet school program, the court would have
failed to show the plan's integrative effectiveness. However, when
it implemented the only effective remedy, the court was barred
under an expansive reading of Milliken L In discussing previous
decisions by the Rehnquist Court, one author explained that
[w]hat emerges from these relatively recent Court decisions
is a judicial acquiescence to the status quo as constitutionally permissible. The status quo consists of relatively
wealthy suburbs, with public school districts made up of
largely white students, surrounding relatively impoverished
cities in separate public school districts made up of largely
minority students."6
In the area of desegregation, the Rehnquist Court has chosen
the goal of judicial restraint over the value of remedying constitutional violations. Yet, "the length of judicial supervision should not

tion programs even if black students remain isolated from whites and attend city schools
where achievement is low."); Williams, supra note 12, at C1 (writing that the Jenkins II
decision has closed the door on court ordered remedies to segregation).
158. Rossell, supra note 149, at 627.
159. Neal Devins, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: The Courts' Abandonment
of Brown v. Board of Education, 26 WM & MARY L. REV. 7, 15 n.19 (1984).
160. Rodney J. Blackman, Returning to Plessy, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 767, 776 (1992).
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be relevant to determining whether discrimination has been eliminated.' 6' And this is where the Court has erred. First, it erred by
cloaking judicial activism in the words of restraint. Second, and
more importantly, the Court has done just what the Gautreaux
Court warned against: making boundary lines "arbitrary and mechanical," so that they become a "shield for those found to have
engaged in unconstitutional conduct."' 6 2
RAINA BRUBAKER

161. Carter, supra note 102, at 891.
162. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 300.

